Planning and Maintaining the Industrial Base: The Critical Task for Transformation to the Objective Force

MAJ Bob Benjamin
Intermediate Level Education, Phase 1

15 June 2005

Planning and Maintaining the Industrial Base: The Critical Task for Transformation to the Objective Force.

What if they held a war and nobody came? Without a plan to develop and sustain industrial research, development and production the Army will be unable to accomplish the goals of transformation to the Objective Force. The successful transformation of the Army to the Objective Force will require the Army to accomplish a number of critical logistical tasks, including Strategic National Task (SN) 1, Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment; SN 4, Provide Sustainment; and SN 6, Conduct Mobilization. However, SN 6.6.7, Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities directly or indirectly supports all of the previously mentioned tasks. Because of this impact, planning and sustaining the industrial base is the most critical task in facilitating the transformation of the Army to the Objective Force.

Planning the necessary changes to the industrial base is crucial to supporting successful mobilization. According to CJCSM 3500.04C, SN 6.6.7, Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities, is itself identified as a critical supporting subtask for the task 6.0 Conduct Mobilization. Furthermore, Strategic National Task (SN) 6.6.3, Expand Logistic Support, requires the Army to “expand logistic support to meet the mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the total force. The expanded support includes maintenance systems, facilities (e.g., military production base, national industrial base, military construction), supply (e.g., storage, handling, procurement, production capability), and service support” (CJCSM 3500.04C 2002). It seems clear that the Army must plan for these needed adjustments to the national industrial base to support mobilization. While clearly critical to the mobilization, maintaining industrial capabilities is also vital to other strategic tasks.

The contribution of the U.S. industrial base is vital to accomplishing the deployment and redeployment of the Army Objective Force. The ambitious goals of this plan include the ability to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a full division within 120 hours, and 5 divisions within 30 days. To accomplish this goal, the Army must improve its current strategic lift posture. The Army will need to maintain the industrial base and “monitor procurement of C17 Globemaster III aircraft by the Air Force and additional Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ships by the Navy to correct the shortfall in strategic lift identified in the last Mobility Requirements Study.” (Caldera, 2000) This responsibility, outlined in SN 4.6, Acquire Materiel, tasks the Army to “procure, produce, buy, lease, rent, or otherwise obtain equipment and supplies for the armed forces. . .according to . . .national strategy” (CJCSM 3500.04C, 2002). Caldera also pointed out that Army Strategic Mobility Program will require partnership and planning with industry in order to successfully implement the Army plan to improve infrastructure at CONUS power projection platforms. If the Army is to accomplish its strategic mobility goals, it must depend upon U.S. industry to supply the needed materiel to support additional strategic lift. Planning and maintaining the industrial base in order to accomplish this task is vitally important. Deployment and redeployment are critical logistical tasks supported by the U.S. industrial base, yet once deployed, our troops need to be sustained.

To sustain the Objective Force, industry must not only develop and produce this force but also be ready to provide the necessary follow-on material to the warfighter. Starns and Gutmanis point out that “The defense industrial base has played a critical role in national security strategy because of its ability to design, develop, and manufacture technologically superior weaponry which provides the Armed Forces with formidable capabilities” (Starns and Gutmanis, 1997). In fact, a number of strategic national tasks have been identified that address this need. SN 4.2.4 Develop Sustainment Base, identifies the need to “To improve, expand, or contract the resources and facilities of an area or a location in the United States and its commonwealths or territories in response to changes in the national military strategy.” (CJCSM 3500.04C, 2002) Furthermore, the transformation to the Objective Force will require the acquisition and sustainment of a variety of new systems. In fact, “Technological transformation . . . will impose new and crucial procurement-related responsibilities on the military.” (Starns and Gutmanis, 1997) These responsibilities are addressed in a variety of strategic national tasks, including SN 4.6.1, Conduct Acquisition, SN 4.6.1.1, Defense Acquisition, SN 4.6.3, Support Logistic Process, SN 6.6.3, Expand Logistics Support, SN 6.6.7 Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities, and SN 7, Conduct Force Development. (CJCSM 3500.04C, 2002) The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out that “Funding the transformation, including developing and acquiring future combat systems and modernizing aging equipment, will be difficult.” (GAO Report to Congressional Committees, 2001) Clearly, developing the Objective Force will require careful planning to secure the required industrial involvement in the development, acquisition, maintenance and Sustainment of the new technology upon which this force depends.

As Leaders, we are often faced with a number of critical tasks; choosing among them can be difficult. In developing the Objective Force, the Army has a number of key logistical tasks that are vital to success. Deployment and Redeployment, dependent on our strategic lift capability, are vital to timely power projection. Successful mobilization depends in part upon the expansion of the industrial base needed to support the increased logistical requirements of an expanded force. Finally, sustainment of the Objective Force relies on the ability of U.S. industry to develop, produce, and maintain the high-tech systems the Objective Force depends upon. All of these tasks require a clear and definite plan in order to maximize what has always been the greatest strength of the United States: our industrial capacity. As such, planning and maintaining our industrial base is the most critical logistic task supporting the Army’s transformation to the Objective Force.